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Abstract
In more than 20% of countries, a single religion is recognized in the constitution. This
article argues that there are good reasons for opposing such ‘mono-recognition’ as it fails
to show due concern to members of constitutionally unrecognized (non-extremist) reli-
gions. Yet rather than opting for disestablishment as Sweden did in 2000, I show that
there may be a better alternative in many cases: To constitutionally recognize a variety of
religions. After distinguishing synchronic forms of plural recognition whereby multiple
religions are constitutionally recognized simultaneously from diachronic forms whereby
state religions are rotated, I defend the latter option. On this approach, a multi-religious
state might have Catholicism as the state religion during the first part of the year, then
Islam, then Judaism, and so on, whereby I argue that there ought to be differences in the
amount of time that religions are recognized depending on differences in the strength of
their claims to constitutional recognition. Besides being fairer than mono-recognition and
synchronic plural recognition, I show that when some religious groups are marginalized,
diachronic plural recognition has significant advantages over non-recognition of any
religion as constitutionally recognizing these groups’ religions sends valuable signals
that their members belong to society.
Keywords State religions .Religiousestablishment .Statechurch .Multiculturalism .Christianity
. Islam . Judaism . Hinduism
1 Introduction
According to a 2017 report by the Pew Research Center (2017), more than 20% of countries
recognizes a single religion in their constitution. For example, section 4 of the Danish
constitution states that “the Evangelical-Lutheran Church is the Danish People’s Church”;
article 2 of the Afghan constitution that “The sacred religion of Islam is the religion of the
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Islamic Republic of Afghanistan”; and article 43 of the Cambodian constitution that “Bud-
dhism shall be the State religion”. Constitutional recognition of a religion, or what I will
interchangeably refer to as ‘religious establishment’ or the presence of a ‘state religion’, is
often accompanied by forms of public support for the recognized religion (e.g. tax exemptions,
payments of clergy salaries, guaranteed representation in legislative assemblies, subsidies for
religious education, subsidies for the maintenance of places of worship) and sometimes also by
discrimination against, and oppression of,1 individuals who do not adhere to the recognized
religion (think of labor market discrimination and of laws that proscribe public endorsements
of non-recognized religions). None of these things are inherent to religious establishment,
however, as it is possible to have largely if not wholly symbolic forms of establishment that
confer few if any tangible benefits upon recognized religions and that do not impose any
significant disadvantages upon non-recognized religions, which some scholars believe can be
found in various contemporary liberal democracies (Maclure and Taylor 2011, 26).
In this article, my aim is to consider whether there are forms of religious establishment that
can be morally justified and, if so, which ones. This question is a timely one as existing
systems of religious establishment have become controversial within many countries. In the
UK, for instance, organizations such as Humanists UK and the National Secular Society (NSS)
have been campaigning for the disestablishment of the Church of England, with some surveys
suggesting that a majority of British people are now supporting their cause (Kellner 2013). In
Iceland, a 2015 poll revealed that 55% of the population wanted the state’s ties with the
Evangelical Lutheran Church to be cut completely (Ingolfsson 2015), whilst a 2013 poll in
Costa Rica, where Catholicism is the state religion, found that 47% of its population wanted a
wholly secular state (América Economía 2013). A similar trend can be witnessed in academia
where a growing chorus of normative theorists has reservations about religious establishment
(e.g. Cohen 2013; Nussbaum 2011, 43–44; Patten 2014, 113).
In what follows, I join this chorus as far as the constitutional recognition of a single religion
or what I refer to as ‘mono-recognition’ is concerned. As I argue, the problem with this type of
recognition is that it fails to show due concern to the interests members of constitutionally
unrecognized (non-extremist) religions. Yet rather than opting for disestablishment as Sweden
did in 2000, I show that there may be a better alternative in many cases: To constitutionally
recognize a variety of religions. After distinguishing synchronic forms of plural recognition
whereby multiple religions are constitutionally recognized simultaneously from diachronic
forms whereby state religions are rotated, I defend the latter option. On this approach, a multi-
religious state might have Catholicism as the state religion during the first part of the year, then
Islam, then Judaism, and so on, whereby I argue that there ought to be differences in the
amount of time that religions are recognized depending on differences in the strength of their
claims to constitutional recognition. Besides being fairer than mono-recognition and synchron-
ic plural recognition, I show that when some religious groups are marginalized, diachronic
plural recognition has significant advantages over non-recognition of any religion as consti-
tutionally recognizing these groups’ religions sends valuable signals that their members belong
to society.
1 One might think, for instance, of the oppression suffered by the Baha’I in Iran and AlArqam Muslims in
Malesia. See Pew Research Center (2017).
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2 Some Preliminaries
Before vindicating these claims, a few preliminary comments are in order.
2.1 Largely if Not Wholly Symbolic Recognition
The first one is that, throughout this article, my focus is on cases where the constitutional
recognition that is granted to particular religions is largely if not wholly symbolic. One thing
this means is that no special legal requirements are imposed upon the ways in which
constitutionally recognized religions govern themselves. For example, even if Catholicism is
the state religion, it would be impermissible for states to force the Catholic Church within their
country to ordain women as priests. Neither would it be permissible for them to make changes
to a religion’s internal laws conditional upon parliamentary approval, which is a requirement to
which the Church of England is subject (Sandberg 2011, 63). The reason for focusing upon
forms of religious establishment that do not impose such requirements is that ones that do are
especially controversial as they impose significant constraints upon people’s associational and
religious liberties. Since my aim here is to consider whether there are defensible forms of
religious establishment simpliciter as opposed to considering whether especially controversial
forms of religious establishment can be vindicated, focusing upon largely if not wholly
symbolic forms of religious establishment helps me to achieve this aim.
Another feature of largely if not wholly symbolic religious establishment that I should
highlight is that citizens who do not adhere to constitutionally recognized religion(s) have
equal basic rights and liberties, including freedoms of conscience, speech, and association;
rights to private property; and rights to political participation. For states to deny such rights and
liberties to this group would be unacceptable as it would violate fundamental principles of
justice by denying people the opportunity to live minimally decent and free lives. At the same
time, largely symbolic religious establishment does not rule out that states grant certain
tangible benefits to constitutionally recognized religions that are refused to other religions.
Such benefits may take the form of non-basic legal rights, as when leaders of state religions
are entitled to participate in state events such as parliamentary inaugurations and state funerals.
However, they might also be financial as long as the expenditures that are made are not too
high (as they would be when, say, a state funded the entire construction of a modern-day
cathedral, which would raise serious distributive justice concerns, but not necessarily when it
simply subsidized the maintenance of places of worship or the salaries of clerics).2 In
defending diachronic plural recognition, I remain non-committal on whether any largely
symbolic forms of religious establishment are justifiable or whether only wholly symbolical
forms are, i.e. forms whereby the only privilege enjoyed by state religions is that they are
recognized in the constitution.
2.2 Compatibility with Liberal Democracy
Another assumption that I make in this article, and this brings me to the second comment, is
that any religions that are constitutionally recognized are compatible with liberal-democratic
politico-legal institutions as I take moderate denominations of e.g. Christianity, Islam, and
Judaism to be. (I will interchangeably refer to such religions as ‘liberal democracy-compatible’
2 For a defense of such policies, see Miller (2019).
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or ‘non-extremist’.) Such compatibility exists when the recognized religions respect principles
and rights that are central to the functioning of liberal democracies, including the rule of law;
civic equality; freedoms of conscience, speech, and association; rights to private property, and
rights to political participation. For states to constitutionally recognize religions that do not fit
this bill, such as Wahhabism, is deeply problematic symbolically as it puts religions upon a
pedestal that oppose the very essentials of a just society, apart from the fact that it risks
emboldening individuals with extremist sympathies (cf. Waldron 2014).
2.3 Secular Comprehensive Doctrines
The third comment is that I am not precluding the possibility that any constitutional recogni-
tion that is granted to religions might need to be extended to (liberal democracy-compatible)
secular comprehensive doctrines such as Humanism and Confucianism. Whether this is the
case will depend on whether religions have features that render it morally permissible, if not
required, to treat them differently in this area. Whilst it is often assumed that they do,
identifying such features turns out to be difficult. To see this, it ought to be noted that, like
religions, secular comprehensive doctrines can be an important component of people’s
identity; imbue their existence with meaning; provide them with moral guidance across various
domains of life; and render them vulnerable to discrimination and oppression. Since an in-
depth discussion of this issue would take us too far afield,3 I will not try to settle it here.
3 Diachronic Plural Recognition vs Mono-Recognition
With these qualifications in place, let us consider why it is that many states have strong reasons –
even if not always decisive ones4 – for adopting a system of diachronic plural recognition, i.e. a
system whereby state religions are rotated. To do so, I want to look in this section at the reasons for
favoring diachronic plural recognition over the constitutional recognition of a single religion or what
I have termed ‘mono-recognition’. In examining these reasons, we will also come across some
important reasons for favoring diachronic plural recognition over synchronic plural recognition or
the simultaneous constitutional recognition of multiple religions (more reasons for favoring this
particular type of plural recognition will be discussed later in this article).
The main advantage of diachronic plural recognition over mono-recognition, I believe, is
that it is fairer by not giving any religion a monopoly on constitutional recognition. Now
defenders of mono-recognition might challenge that mono-recognition is less fair in cases
where there is a single religion with the strongest claim to constitutional recognition based on
the size of its population within society and the societal contributions of its members, i.e. the
ways in which its members have contributed to the country’s cultural, political, and economic
landscapes over the past decades if not centuries.5 Under these conditions, mono-recognition
3 For more elaborate discussions, see e.g. Laborde (2015), Koppelman (2006), and Leiter 2013).
4 I will say more about when these reasons might be overridden in the final section.
5 Assuming that these features are relevant in determining the strength of such claims, as seems plausible. All
other things being equal, it looks like a religion with, say, thee million members in society has stronger claims to
constitutional recognition than a religion with only three hundred members, just as a long-standing religion
whose members have heavily shaped the society’s culture, economy, and political landscape appears to have
stronger claims than a religion of recent immigrants who have collectively contributed much less within these
areas.
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might be understood to be at least as defensible as forms of plural recognition given that
adopting the latter type of religious establishment would mean that the religion with the
strongest claim to constitutional recognition would be recognized on a par with religions with
weaker claims to constitutional recognition and potentially much weaker ones. For example, it
would mean that Anglicanism in England and Lutheranism in Denmark would be given the
same amount of constitutional recognition as minority religions such a Hinduism and Islam
that have much smaller populations and that are relatively new to these societies. The problem
with this, our critics may say, is that it fails to show equal moral concern to citizens by giving
per capita less weight to the presence and societal contributions of members of religions with
the strongest claim to constitutional recognition than is given to the presence and societal
contributions of members of religions with weaker claims. Even when denying constitutional
recognition to religions with weaker claims is also problematic as it does not give any weight
to their members’ presence and societal contributions, our critics might argue that this is not a
worse evil and, correspondingly, that mono-recognition is at least as defensible as plural
recognition.
The problem with this argument is that it ignores the fact that, unlike synchronic plural
recognition which recognizes multiple religions simultaneously, diachronic plural recognition
can do justice to differences in religions’ entitlements to constitutional recognition by recog-
nizing them for different durations. In England, for instance, the Anglican Church could be
constitutionally recognized for five months of the year, Catholicism for two months, Islam for
one month, Hinduism for two weeks, and so on.6 In so doing, states avoid the abovementioned
evils of giving religions either too much constitutional recognition or too little constitutional
recognition.
To be sure, for a religion to be constitutionally recognized will be meaningful only insofar
as it is recognized for a minimum duration. Were a religion to be constitutionally recognized
for a mere hour, say, this would clearly be too short. What is important for our purposes is that
within societies with mono-recognition, there usually appears to be at least one unrecognized
religion with a claim to constitutional recognition that is strong enough to entitle it to a
meaningful amount of recognition-time.7 In order to bring this out, notice that for a religion to
be entitled to one day of constitutional recognition per year based wholly on its population size
– which seems a meaningful amount given that it is the same unit that is successfully used for
birthdays, various holidays, and commemorative days such as Martin Luther King Day – its
members need to comprise a mere 0,27% of the country’s population insofar as all citizens
adhere to some religion and even less if a proportion of them does not. When we consider that
the large majority of countries have religious minorities whose populations well exceed this
percentage (Pew Research Center 2012) and that these groups have generally been present
within society for decades if not centuries (a period during which their members have
ordinarily made significant societal contributions),8 it looks exceedingly rare for mono-
6 Whilst Alan Patten does not defend forms of temporal accommodation for different religions and cultures, he
does provide a theory of multiculturalism that is pro-rated in that the amount of state support that different
religions and cultures are due is based on the size of their populations. See Patten (2014).
7 Notice that when religions lack strong enough claims to be entitled to the minimum amount of meaningful
recognition-time, denying them constitutional recognition need not be unfair and might be necessary in order to
avoid a proliferation of state religions.
8 Even when any negative contributions that they have made should be taken into account as well, it is dubious
whether religious minorities will have typically caused significantly more harm than religious majorities.
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recognition to be justified on grounds that only one religion within a multi-religious society is
entitled to a meaningful amount of recognition-time.
In fact, such scenarios become more unlikely still when we take into account a third
variable that seems relevant for determining the strength of a religion’s claim to constitutional
recognition, namely any injustices that its members have suffered at the hands of the state or
the wider society and in some cases continue to suffer. For a paradigmatic example of such an
injustice, one might think of a case where a state has reduced the population of a particular
religion by having organized a pogrom against its members. However, even when no such
large-scale violence was committed, widespread discrimination against the members of a
specific religion might still have prevented, and sometimes continues to prevent, people from
contributing as much to society as they would have been able to contribute otherwise/would be
able to contribute otherwise. Under such conditions, it would be unfair to make the amount of
recognition-time that is granted to a religion depend wholly upon the size of its population and
upon the societal contributions of its members given that if the relevant injustices had not
occurred/did not occur, the religion in question would score higher along these dimensions,
which suggests that weight needs to be added to its recognition-claim. Since it is usually
religious minorities who have suffered disproportional amounts of injustice at the hands of the
state and/or the wider society, this then provides further grounds for thinking that there are few,
if any, cases where mono-recognition is justified simply because no more than one religion
within society is entitled to a meaningful amount of recognition-time.
4 Objections and Some Rejoinders
4.1 Symbolic Recognition and the Scope of Fairness
At this point, two objections need to be addressed. One says that I am wrong in thinking that
mono-recognition is less fair than diachronic plural recognition by virtue of giving one religion
a monopoly upon constitutional recognition. On this view, at least when the recognition that is
granted is wholly symbolic, which rules out e.g. subsidies for clergy salaries and for the
maintenance of places of worship, there cannot be unfairness in refusing it to all but one
religion. The reason for this, the objection continues, is that such recognition is not objectively
or inherently valuable and only things that are objectively or inherently value can be subject to
principles of fairness.
Some might respond to this objection by rejecting the claim that wholly symbolic religious
establishment lacks objective or inherent value. Whether this is correct or not, I want to suggest
that even if we accept this premise, it does not follow that decisions about which religions are
constitutionally recognized fall outside the purview of principles of fairness.9 To illustrate this,
consider a family with young triplets. Every time this family goes somewhere by car, the
children Adam, Bernhard, and Chris argue over who is allowed to sit in the middle of the back
of the car. The parents are puzzled by this as sitting in the middle is not objectively or
inherently valuable. On the contrary, because the middle seat offers less space and has no
adjacent door to lean against, the objective or inherent value of sitting in the middle is lower
than that of occupying one of the two side-seats. (Suppose arguendo that that none of the
children suffer from car sickness, which is a reason for some individuals to want to sit in the
9 I develop this point in more detail in De Vries (Forthcoming).
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middle as looking through the front window protects them from feeling sick.) Still, insofar as
the parents only ever allow, say, Adam to sit in the middle, it looks like Bernhard and Chris are
being treated unfairly unless the parents have good reasons for giving Adam a monopoly upon
the middle seat. Likewise, even if there is nothing objectively or inherently valuable about
religious establishment, when a state constitutionally recognizes the religion of a group of
citizens A but not the religion of another group of citizens B and at least some members of B
want their religion to be constitutionally recognized, it seems that the state is treating its
citizens unfairly unless it has good reasons for refusing constitutional recognition to B’s
religion.
A critic might accept this but argue that within societies with mono-recognition, members
of unrecognized religions do no actually desire constitutional recognition of their religion. To
the extent that this is correct and these individuals need to have such desires in order for it to be
unfair to deny constitutional recognition to their religion, it follows that it cannot be unfair for
contemporary states to maintain their systems of mono-recognition.
Whilst I am unaware of any survey data on this issue, there is reason for doubting the
empirical premise of this argument. When we consider the significance that is commonly
attached to even largely symbolic forms of state recognition – for example, although civil
partnerships gave British same-sex couples virtually all the same legal rights as married
heterosexual couples had before same-sex marriages were legalized in 2013, being able to
marry still mattered deeply to many gays and lesbians – along with the fact that in almost all
societies with mono-recognition, thousands if not millions of people adhere to religions other
than the state religion, one might expect that there are usually some citizens who want the state
to constitutionally recognize their unrecognized religion. Further support for this supposition is
provided by the fact that when religious groups seek rights and privileges that are already held
by other religious groups within society, their members often do not simply care about the
tangible benefits involved, as important as these may be to them. In many cases, they also care
about the symbolism of receiving said rights and privileges. Just witness the decision of the
German city-state of Bremen to recognize Islamic organizations as religious bodies in 2013,
which was a status that Christian organizations and Jewish organizations already enjoyed
within its jurisdiction. Whilst this decision gave local Muslims various new legal entitlements,
including the right to take days off on Islamic holidays and the right to bury their dead
according to their religious precepts (i.e. without a coffin), this was not the only reason why it
was welcomed. As Erol Pürlü, a spokesperson for the German Muslim Coordination Council
put it, the decision was also welcomed by the Muslim community because it “sends a clear
signal that Islam belongs to Germany” (Deutsche Welle 2013).
So far, I have suggested that within societies with mono-recognition, there is likely to be a
proportion of citizens with unrecognized recognition-entitled religions who desire constitu-
tional recognition of their religion. What I want to add here is that even when these citizens are
not present, it seems that insofar as they would be present if (more) citizens with unrecognized
religions were to contemplate a scenario in which their religion is constitutionally recognized,
this is already enough to render existing systems of mono-recognition morally problematic. To
see this, notice that denying its sufficiency would mean, among other things, that when citizens
with unrecognized recognition-entitled religions have never imagined a world in which their
religion is constitutionally recognized because the decade- if not century-long constitutional
recognition of another religion has made its sole established status look natural, this could
justify existing systems of mono-recognition even when some of these individuals would want
their religion to be constitutionally recognized if they were to imagine such a world.
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If I am right in thinking that this is an implausible implication and, consequently, right in
thinking that such counterfactual desires for constitutional recognition carry normative weight,
then this provides additional support for the notion that diachronic plural recognition is fairer
than mono-recognition within multi-religious societies. The reason for this is that there exists a
high probability that at least some citizens within these societies would want their unrecog-
nized recognition-entitled religion to be constitutionally recognized upon reflection. Perhaps
the easiest way of showing this is to point out that few individuals seem to have ever
contemplated the possibility of plural recognition within their society given that there are no
contemporary examples of either synchronic plural recognition or diachronic plural recogni-
tion (indeed, I am the first to set out the idea of diachronic plural recognition in this article).
Once we take this into account along with the already mentioned fact that many people within
contemporary societies are sensitive to unequal distributions of state recognition, it becomes
highly plausible that a proportion of citizens with unrecognized recognition-entitled religions
would want their religion to be constitutionally recognized alongside the current state religion
and possible other religions, whether synchronically or diachronically.
4.2 Prorated Recognition Versus Non-Prorated Recognition
The other objection does not challenge my claim that, ceteris paribus, diachronic plural
recognition ought to be favored over mono-recognition within multi-religious societies.
Instead, it challenges my claim that this type of religious establishment ought to reflect
differences in the strength of religions’ entitlements to constitutional recognition by recogniz-
ing them for different amounts of time. Critics of such pro-rated recognition may point to how
the Presidency of the Council of the European Union is rotated among EU member-states at
equal intervals of six months regardless of the size of their populations, their contributions to
the EU budget, and so on.10 Whilst this model has not been immune from criticism (e.g.
Vanhoonacker et al. 2011), those who object to it rarely do so on grounds that they consider it
to be unfair that EU-member states hold the presidency for equal amounts of time. However, if
this system is not unfair, then it might be said that neither can a version of diachronic plural
recognition be under which religions are recognized for the same duration.
My rejoinder is that even if we grant the premise that the rotating Presidency of the EU
Council is not unfair, which some might wish to question, there is a relevant asymmetry
between it and a version of diachronic plural recognition that allows for differences in
recognition-time. Since the EU is a union of sovereign states,11 there is at least something
to be said for giving equal presidency-time to its member-states. However, since states consist
of collections of individual citizens to whom they owe equal moral concern, giving equal
recognition-time to religions irrespective of the strength of their claims to constitutional
recognition looks much harder to justify. To see this, notice that if I am right that some
religions have stronger claims to constitutional recognition than other religions because of the
fact that they have more adherents; the fact that their adherents have contributed more to
society; and/or the fact that their adherents have suffered greater injustice at the hands of the
state and/or the wider society, then by granting the same amount of recognition-time to
religions, states are treating the adherents of religions with stronger claims to constitutional
recognition as if their presence and societal contributions along with any injustices suffered by
10 I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this case.
11 This is true even if it is acquiring some federation-like characteristics.
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them matter less as the presence and societal contributions of, and possible injustices suffered
by, the adherents of religions with weaker claims.
5 Diachronic Plural Recognition vs Non-Recognition of any Religion
I have argued that when the choice is between mono-recognition and diachronic plural
recognition, there are strong reasons for favoring the latter. In particular, I argued that
diachronic plural recognition is fairer than mono-recognition by not giving any religion a
monopoly upon constitutional recognition. At the same time, I suggested that because religions
tend to have unequal claims to constitutional recognition, diachronic plural recognition is fairer
than synchronic plural recognition by allowing religions with stronger claims to receive more
recognition-time than religions with weaker claims. The main point that I want to make in this
section and the next is that, within many multi-religious societies, there are also strong reasons
for favoring diachronic plural recognition over a system whereby no religion is constitutionally
recognized – call this ‘non-recognition of any religion’ for short. Along the way, several
additional reasons will be identified for favoring diachronic plural recognition over synchronic
plural recognition.
5.1 Protection from Radical Secularism and Religious Extremism
Two pro-establishment arguments have been proposed recently by David Miller. Focusing
upon mono-recognition, Miller (2019) believes that religious establishment should come with
duties for established religions to give religion in general a voice in public debates and to
protect it against the forces of “radical secularism”, which are understood to be manifested in
e.g. head scarf-bans in public buildings. When such duties are performed, he thinks that
believers of all stripes benefit from the presence of an established religion, including members
of (vulnerable) religious groups whose religion is not constitutionally recognized.
In fact, Miller’s view is that even agnostics and atheists draw net benefits from this kind of
ecumenical establishment as he goes on to suggest that it has a moderating influence upon
established religions. The idea here is that when established religions are expected to represent
the interests of, and collaborate with, other religions – he gives the example of how the Church
of England is expected to engage in inter-faith dialogue and to involve members of other
religions in official events such as parliamentary inaugurations and state funerals – they are
disincentivized from espousing extreme views as to do so would compromise their ability to
fulfil these tasks. According to Miller, this in turn has the effect that
The public voice of an established church is likely to be moderate, ecumenical, and
closer in substance to secular discourse. You don’t find spokespersons for these
churches arguing that evolution is nonsense or that Jews must seize the whole of
Jerusalem to hasten the second coming of Christ. A rational atheist, therefore, must
weigh the comparative advantages and disadvantages of establishment and disestablish-
ment, on the assumption that the latter won’t mean the end of religion itself or its
disappearance from the public sphere (Miller 2019).
What is apposite for us is that if it is true that Miller’s ecumenical establishment helps to
protect religious interests from radical secularism and to prevent extremism within the ranks of
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established religions, then given that these effects appear to be valuable, this would provide
reasons for favoring this type of establishment over non-recognition of any religion. However,
since an investigation into these ostensible effects is well beyond this article’s scope, I should
note that whilst my case for diachronic plural recognition would be strengthened by their
existence, it does not depend upon their existence as I will provide independent arguments for
diachronic plural recognition within the next section.
Now Miller himself is doubtful as to whether plural recognition can fulfil the ecumenical
functions just mentioned and, consequently, have the instrumental benefits under
consideration.
The idea of establishment involves recognising the church's special authority to speak on
religious matters, but also […] giving it the responsibility to serve all citizens in an
inclusive way. It's unclear how this could be done in the case of more than one
institution (Miller 2019).
Some might disagree with the notion that only a single religion can fulfil this inclusive role.
Even if there are limits to how many religions can fulfil it, they may argue that it is possible for
two or three religions to do so and possibly even more. What I want to suggest here is that even
if this is mistaken, this merely shows that synchronic plural recognition is unfit for purpose, not
diachronic plural recognition. The reason for this is that at no point in time would more than
one religion be constitutionally recognized under the proposed diachronic variant.
Admittedly, state religions will be able to discharge the abovementioned ecumenical
functions only if they are constitutionally recognized for a meaningful amount of time – for
them to be recognized for a mere hour, say, will be of little use. Whilst a discussion of
precisely how much recognition-time is needed would take us too far afield as it would require
us, inter alia, to specify in more detail what these functions involve (which Miller does not do
in his article), what matters for us is a point that I made in the penultimate section, namely that
such thresholds can be built into a system of diachronic plural recognition. One way of doing
so is to exclusively recognize religions with strong enough claims to constitutional recognition
to be entitled to the requisite amount of recognition-time based on their population size, their
members’ societal contributions, and any injustices that their members have suffered at the
hands of the state and/or the wider society. Another approach is to recognize some religions for
longer periods than is warranted based on the strength of their claims to constitutional
recognition so that they are recognized for the requisite duration. Although such an approach
is unfair in some respects as it discounts other religions’ claims to constitutional recognition to
a certain degree, it should be noted that refusing constitutional recognition to religions that
have some claim to such recognition but not one that is strong enough to entitle them to the
requisite amount of recognition-time is also unfair in certain respects as it means that the
claims of these religions do not translate into any recognition-time. At least when religions are
not too far removed from the threshold, then, it might be argued that it is morally permissible if
not required for states to constitutionally recognize them for the requisite duration.
5.2 Communicative Value
Having looked at two potential benefits of religious establishment, namely the provision of
protection against radical secularism and the provision of protection against religious extrem-
ism, I now want to suggest that there are communicative reasons for favoring diachronic plural
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recognition specifically over non-recognition of any religion when there are religious groups
within society that are marginalized in that their members suffer significantly higher levels of
discrimination and hostility than the members of other religious and non-religious groups. To
focus attention, consider the following expressions of anti-Islamic sentiments and violence that
have occurred in Germany over the past years:
& In the East-German city of Dresden, demonstrations of anti-Islam movement Pegida
attracted 10,000 s of people during the mid-2010s (BBC 2015).
& In 2017 alone, 950 violent attacks were committed against Muslims and against Islamic
institutions such as mosques according to statistics from the Department of Interior (Zeit
Online 2018).
& More recently, a far-right extremist killed nine people in two shisha-bars in the West-
German city of Hanau, an attack that is widely believed to have been motivated by
Islamophobic motives (Deutsche Welle 2020).
& In an interview with the German tabloid Bild in 2018, interior minister Horst Seehofer
stated that “Islam does not belong to Germany” (Süddeutsche Zeitung 2018).
& Anti-immigrant and anti-Islam party Alternative Für Deutschland [Alternative for Germa-
ny] is currently the largest opposition party in the national parliament with 12,8% of the
seats. In 2019, the AFD won 27% of the votes in local elections in Saxony where it
finished second just behind the Christian-Democrats (CDU).
Further evidence of the vulnerable position of Muslims within German society is provided by
studies into labor market discrimination against this group. For example, in a recent study
(Weichselbaumer 2020), 1474 resumes were sent to German firms that were identical except
for the fact that some had the native German name ‘Sandra Bauer’ on them; some the Turkish
name ‘Meryem Öztürk’ but with the same picture as the Sandra Bauer-resumes (in Germany,
resumes tend to have pictures); and some the name ‘Meryem Öztürk’ with again the same
picture except for the fact that the woman shown on it wore a headscarf this time. The findings
were that whilst Sandra Bauer was invited for an interview in 18.8% of cases, Meryem Öztürk
without a headscarf received an invitation in 13.5% of cases and Meryem Öztürk with a
headscarf did so in only 4.2% of cases.
Against this socio-political background, there can be little doubt that for Germany to
recognize Islam as the sole state religion for certain periods would send a powerful message
that this religion belongs to society and, implied by this, its members. This is true at least when
each time a new religion is constitutionally recognized under a system of diachronic plural
recognition, the state informs the public of this as I assume here it should. Ways of doing so
might include, but are not limited to, announcing the new state religion on social media and on
public broadcasters; allowing its leaders to play a ceremonial role in state events such as
parliamentary inaugurations and state funerals; and displaying its symbols in parliament in the
same way that a Christian crucifix is displayed in Quebec’s National Assembly.
Why is it important for states to signal the civic inclusion of marginalized religious groups?
One reason is that because of the symbolic value that many people attach to the state’s actions
and inactions, not doing so can easily aggravate discrimination and hostility against their
members by making such discrimination and hostility seem legitimate (cf. Waldron 2014).
This is the case when the state’s unwillingness to send such signals is widely interpreted as
reflecting prejudice against these individuals or as expressing simple indifference towards their
fate. However, even when no such prejudice or indifference is perceived in such omissions, the
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fact that the state’s speech is imbued with symbolic significance means that for governments to
publicly affirm the civic inclusion of marginalized religious groups still has the potential to
reduce discrimination and hostility against their members by shaping public attitudes (for more
about the impact of state speech upon public attitudes and about the importance of the state’s
role as a propagator of liberal-democratic values, see Brettschneider 2012).
Of course, constitutionally recognizing the religions of marginalized religious groups is not
the only way in which states might communicate that these groups belong to society. Other
ways of doing so include e.g. speaking out against any unlawful discrimination and violence
suffered by their members and imposing strict penalties upon those who are found guilty of
such discrimination and violence. In the next section, I will address the objection that my case
for diachronic plural recognition is underdetermined; for now, I want to suggest another reason
why it is important that states signal the civic inclusion of marginalized religious groups.
According to this reason, sending such signals also matters because it provides their
members with assurances that the authorities are on their side and that they are regarded by
those in power as full and equal citizens. Having such assurances is not just valuable because it
may offer peace of mind, though this is a significant benefit. As Adam Omar Hosein (2018)
has pointed out, it also helps people to take advantage of their legal rights, especially those that
involve direct interaction with government officials. For example, studies from the United
States have found that individuals who lack trust in state institutions – as is common among
black people within this country as well as among those with Arab, Middle Eastern, Muslim,
and South Asian backgrounds – are less likely to report crimes that were committed against
them than individuals who do have such trust (Huq et al. 2011; Tyler 2005). (Of course, being
assured of the state’s commitment to upholding one’s rights and liberties will be valuable only
if the state actually has this commitment as I assume here it does. When this is not the case, for
citizens to believe that they can count upon the state’s protection and support when they cannot
is not only problematic because of the deception involved, but also because they might end up
in dangerous situations as when they wrongly expect law-enforcers to protect them from
physical assault.)
6 Objections and Some Rejoinders
6.1 Underdetermination
As already alluded to, there are ways for states to communicate that marginalized religious
groups belong to society that do not involve granting constitutional recognition to their
respective religions, which may lead some to argue that my communicative case for diachronic
plural recognition is underdetermined. Besides the ones already mentioned, namely speaking
out against any unlawful discrimination and violence suffered by their members and imposing
strict penalties upon those responsible for such discrimination and violence, one might think,
for instance, of designating some of their religious holidays as public holidays; arranging visits
between their leaders and the country’s president or monarch; and subsidizing schools that are
organized around tenets of their faiths.
My response to this objection is that whilst it is true that constitutionally recognizing the
religions of marginalized religious groups is not the only way of signaling that these groups
belong to society, doing so is a highly effective way. In fact, when we consider that
constitutions lay out the fundamental principles of states and carry much symbolic value
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within most countries, there appear to be few ways of sending these signals that are more
powerful and unambiguous. This power is amplified further by the fact that under diachronic
plural recognition, constitutionally recognized religions are the sole state religion for a given
period as opposed to being merely one state religion among many as they are under synchronic
plural recognition. For just as celebrating the birthdays of all members of a family on the same
day diminishes the communicative value of each person’s birthday as no family member
would be receiving special attention, so for a state to constitutionally recognize several
religions simultaneously – in some cases tens if not hundreds of religions – is bound to reduce
the communicative value of each religion’s recognition as no religion would ever stand in the
limelight.
Besides being a particularly potent way of signaling the civic inclusion of marginalized
religious groups, it should be noted that constitutionally recognizing the religions of these
groups is a relatively cheap and therefore efficient signaling tool as well. Apart from the fact
that constitutionally recognizing a religion does not impose any financial costs in and of itself,
communicating its established status need not be expensive. I have mentioned that it can
already be done by e.g. posting messages on social media and making announcements on
public broadcasters. But if these observations are correct, then whatever other measures states
could and perhaps should take in order to signal that marginalized religious groups belong to
society, they seem to have strong reasons for constitutionally recognizing their religions and
for doing so under a system of diachronic plural recognition specifically.
6.2 Preferences for Non-Recognition
Another objection maintains that diachronic plural recognition, among other forms of religious
establishment, fails to pay heed to the preferences of citizens who do not want the state to
constitutionally recognize any religion, who might include many atheists. There are two things
to be said in response. First, insofar as these preferences are motivated by the belief that such
recognition unfairly favors the interests of believers over those of individuals with secular (i.e.
non-religious) comprehensive doctrines, I should repeat a point made at the outset, namely that
I am not precluding the possibility that any constitutional recognition that is granted to
religions might need to be extended to secular comprehensive doctrines such as Humanism
and Confucianism. Whether this is the case will depend on whether religions have features that
render it morally permissible if not required to treat them differently in this area.
However, and this brings me to the second point, insofar as the objection is that diachronic
plural recognition does not accommodate the preferences of citizens who categorially oppose
constitutional recognition of all religions or of certain specific religions (which might include
their own religion), I do not think that this is a convincing objection. For as long as the
recognized religions are both compatible with liberal democracy and entitled to constitutional
recognition under the proposed criteria, as I assume in this article they are, it does not seem
reasonable to complain about the fact that they are constitutionally recognized as such even if it
is reasonable to object on distributive grounds to any tangible benefits that might come with
this status. In order to bring this out, notice that under the model of diachronic plural
recognition defended here, for a religion to be constitutionally recognized does not mean that
the state regards it as the true faith or as a faith that is otherwise superior to other faiths within
society, which would have the implausible implication that whenever a new religion becomes
the state religion, it would gain the status of the true or otherwise superior faith. All that the
conferral of such recognition communicates is that the recognized religion has a legitimate
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place within society and, implied by this, that its adherents are full and equal citizens, which is
the same message that is sent when, for instance, states recognize certain holidays of minority
religions as national holidays. Since this is a perfectly reasonable message to send and, I have
argued, a practically important one when the adherents of some religions face comparatively
high levels of discrimination and hostility (see the previous section), it is hard to see how one
can have a morally valid complaint against it.
6.3 Neo-Establishment
Some might accept this but say that it remains odd to introduce diachronic plural recognition
within societies where there is no pre-existing religious establishment. Consider Germany
where several religions are legally recognized as eligible for receiving a state-collected
religious tax [Kirchensteuer] but where there are no state religions. Even if I am right that
constitutionally recognizing Islam under a system of diachronic plural recognition would have
significant benefits within this country given the levels of discrimination and hostility to which
local Muslims are exposed (see the previous section), creating a system of religious establish-
ment ex nihilo may strike many as an unorthodox measure.
Whilst introducing religious establishment would certainly be unorthodox in today’s world,
I do not think that this is a compelling reason against it as such. Consider the abolition of
slavery and the enfranchisement of women; although these policies were highly unorthodox at
the time that they were introduced, their unorthodox character did not seem to have provided
even pro tanto reasons against their enactment. What these and other similar cases suggest is
that merely pointing out that it would be unusual for contemporary states to introduce religious
establishment is not enough to argue against it, at least not when there are good reasons for its
introduction.
Another thing to mention here is that even if adopting diachronic plural recognition only
made sense in societies where religious establishment already exists, the findings of this article
would remain relevant given that many of the circa 20% of countries with mono-recognition
are home to marginalized religious groups that do not have their religion constitutionally
recognized (Pew Research Center 2017, 2019). If my arguments are sound, then these
countries would still have reasons for changing to a system of diachronic plural recognition.
7 Concluding Remarks
I have argued that diachronic plural recognition is fairer than mono-recognition and synchronic
plural recognition respectively, before arguing that there are communicative reasons within
many societies for favoring this type of religious establishment over both non-recognition of
any religion and synchronic plural recognition. To avoid confusion, I should end by noting that
this does not mean that introducing diachronic plural recognition will always be justified
within these societies. Cases where it might not be include ones where abandoning existing
systems of mono-recognition will be experienced by many citizens as a threat to their religion
and/or culture and lead to serious social instability (e.g. riots) as well as ones where introduc-
ing any form of religious establishment will cause such instability because many citizens are
militant atheists. Still, if I am right that diachronic plural recognition has important benefits for
marginalized religious groups, then in large parts of the world, the reasons for adopting this
type of religious establishment are not easily overridden.
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